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Abstract 
This paper explores and analyses the change in collective arrangements, such as the 
changing organizational structure and form of the airport, and its effects and 
consequences on the spatial and economic development of the airport itself and its 
surrounding areas at the metropolitan level. We use Schiphol airport as case study, 
and focus our analysis on three main analytical levels: air (development in the 
aviation sector), money (economic performance), and space (airport spatial 
expansion and urban planning). The paper show that new collective arrangements 
may lead to a radical shift in the position and the power of local actors and hence on 
the decision making concerning the spatial and economic development of localities 
(in this case the Schiphol and Schiphol region) and the metropolitan regions.  
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1 This paper is published in the co-edited book titeld: Megastructure Schiphol; design in spectacular simplicity. NAi 
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A New Form of Management 
 
The year 1957 was a decisive moment in the history of Schiphol. A new form of 
management was completed for the airport. On 22 January 1958 Schiphol changed 
from a department of the City of Amsterdam into a corporation, the ‘Luchthaven 
Schiphol N.V.’. The Dutch state held 65 per cent of the shares in the new private 
limited company, Amsterdam 34 per cent and Rotterdam 1 per cent. The authorized 
capital of the enterprise was set at 200 million guilders, 73.5 million of which was 
deposited upon the company’s launch. The remainder of the capital was made up in 
full by contributions from the state, the City of Amsterdam and the City of 
Rotterdam.1 From the early 1960s the capital of the company was steadily increased 
in order to finance expansion and reconstruction plans of the airport. Increasing 
amounts of capital were also brought in from third parties, Amsterdam banks in 
particular, as shown in Graph 1. In 1966, for instance, Schiphol obtained a loan from 
the ABN bank for 37.75 million guilders, at an annual rate of interest of 7.25 per 
cent.2 The ratio of shareholders’ equity to external capital fell to about 1.5 to 1 in the 
1970s, rose to nearly 3 to 1 in the 1980s and then declined again to a level of about 1 
to 1 around 2010. 
 
Graph 1. Overview of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol’s assets, debts and shareholders’ 
equity from 1958 t0 2011. 
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Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1958–2009 
 
The organizational structure of the new enterprise gave a rather significant amount 
of power to the board of directors. The stakeholders assigned all authority for 
administration and management to a board of three directors, who were also given a 
broad mandate to implement the expansion of the airport. The board of directors 
was made accountable to a supervisory board. This board had 11 members, six of 
whom were appointed by the minister for Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management, four by the City of Amsterdam and one by the City of Rotterdam. 
Although this structure had been proposed by Amsterdam in order to compensate 
for the state’s overwhelming predominance among the stakeholders, this 
nevertheless meant the city’s hold on the airport diminished. From this point on, 
Amsterdam was in the minority at every level. For the first time in its history, 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol was able to operate relatively independently of the 
city. Schiphol began to behave like a private business company. At the same time, 
however, the unique organizational structure ensured that Schiphol enjoyed the 
protection of higher political and administrative powers than most ordinary 
business enterprises. The airport became a powerful actor at local, regional and 
national level, and an enclave in an economic, political, administrative and spatial 
sense.  
 The institutional transformation of the airport that took place in 1958 would 
have far-reaching consequences for the development of the surrounding region, as 
we will see below. The growth of Schiphol would contribute significantly to the 
development of a nebula urban structure in the Amsterdam-Schiphol region in 
particular, and the Randstad in general e.g.  the urban conurbation  of  the western 
region of the Netherlands.3  
 
Air 
  
Why did Amsterdam relinquish control of Schiphol? The reason was that the city 
was no longer able to constantly pump money into the airport in order to keep pace 
with the rapid developments in aircraft technology and civil aviation after the 
Second World War. The transition from propellers to jet engines, the advent of 
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larger aircraft, declining ticket prices and the expansion of passenger and cargo 
traffic activities that accompanied these revolutionary changes4 meant huge 
investments had to be made to increase the capacity of the airport -Longer and 
sturdier runways, larger aprons, more spacious terminal facilities –, Amsterdam 
simply no longer had the means to pay for all that. And after all the government had 
acknowledged the national significance of Schiphol in 1945 by designating it as the 
‘world airport’ of the Netherlands. 
 A subsequent round of airport reconstruction and expansion was sparked by 
an institutional revolution in the airline industry that began in the late 1970s. Air 
travel was increasingly turned over to the free market forces e.g. liberalisation and 
deregulation of the air market. The expectation was that growing competition would 
lead to a drastic decrease in ticket prices. Liberalization and deregulation began in 
the domestic market of the United States, subsequently expanded to transatlantic 
routes and finally extended to air travel market within Europe as well.5 
 Airlines were now able to select their routes based on market conditions. As a 
result, the idea of hubing became popular, seen as the most efficient way of 
interconnecting different air networks of far-flung destinations (e.g. spokes). 
Airports seized on the hub-and-spokes concept to establish a secure position in a 
market that displayed growing instability and uncertainty. Given the fact that not 
every route could turn a profit, airports that aimed to become hubs strived to 
schedule arriving and departing flights at peak times in as precise accordance as 
possible with one another, so that connections could take place quickly. Successful 
hubs were able to attract more traffic and reinforce their market position .6 Such a 
strategy was more likely to succeed if an airport had sufficient additional space/land 
to expand. 
 From the mid-1980s, the ‘N.V. Luchthaven Schiphol’ also adopted the hub-
and-spokes concept as the basis for its operational policy. Schiphol aimed to become 
a ‘mainport’: a hub on the level of Frankfurt, Paris or London, not one in the 
Zaventem or Dusseldorf category. The mainport strategy outlined by the company 
dovetailed perfectly– and not coincidentally – with the government’s stated 
ambitions to turn the Netherlands into Europe’s ideal ‘distribution land’. Surely 
Dutch Distribution Land could not do without a first-class hub for air traffic?  
 Implementing the mainport strategy not only meant that facilities for 
accommodating aircraft had to be significantly expanded, but also that the size and 
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scope  of airport facilities and landside activities  had to be significantly expanded. 
The airport would have to be designed as the world’s best ‘transfer-friendly’ 
configuration in order to ensure that passengers could walk easily from one gate to 
another and that larger quantities of transfer baggage could as quickly as possible be 
processed. Runways and aprons, as well as support services like baggage handling 
and terminals, had to be designed to handle much higher numbers of airplanes and 
passengers at peak hours than before. 
 
Money 
 
Since the institutionalisation as a national airport Schiphol has expanded and 
renewed itself in waves. Graph 2 shows how its non-current assets increased: more 
than doubling in the latter half of the 1960s and again at the end of the 1970s and, 
after a period of relative stagnation in the 1980s, doubling again in the mid-1990s 
and in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The inauguration of the new 
airport in 1967 was merely a first phase in an expansion that unfolded in leaps and 
bounds. Each time there was investment on a massive scale in runways, taxiways, 
aprons, roads, equipment, terminals and other buildings.  
 
Graph 2. Growth of current assets of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from 1945 to 
2011. 
 
 
Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1945–2011 
 6 
 
These investments, of course, were partly related to air traffic. However, other 
factors, such as technological innovations in the aeronautic sector, increasing 
welfare, disposable incomes en free time, the democratization of the air transport 
market and increase in international trade, played key role in explaining the 
significant increasing demand for air transport (passengers and cargo), and 
consequently the fast increase in air traffic (see Graph 3). 
 
Graph 3. Passengers (right axis) and cargo transport figures (left axis) on regular 
and irregular flights out of Schiphol between 1945 and 2011. 
 
Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1945–2011  
 
This development also generated enormous income for the airport. Revenues from 
airport dues (landing and parking rights, compensation for passenger 
accommodations and the like, which the airport levied on its flying clients) 
increased significantly with every phase of Schiphol’s expansion and renovation and 
remain the biggest single source of income for the company (Graph 4).  
 
Graph 4. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol revenue from various sources of income 
between 1945 and 2011 (in million guilders).  
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Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1945–2011 
 
From the 1950s on, however, Schiphol evolved into much more than a transfer 
airport in international air-networks/or international flight routes. In addition to 
the airside, landside activities became increasingly significant to the operations of 
the airport, and as additional source of revenues. Although admission fees for 
visitors (which around 1957 still generated about the same revenue as airport fees 
for aircrafts) were abolished in 1971, but other sources of revenue began to generate 
more and more income to the airport. The first duty-free shops were opened in 1957. 
KLM obtained concessions to sell tobacco, liquor and chocolate; Amsterdam 
businesses were allowed to sell cameras, watches and perfume at Schiphol. After 
1980, retail concessions grew into the airport’s second-highest source of revenues. 
The selection on offer became more and more diverse. Alongside duty-free shops, 
numerous other businesses made their appearance at the airport, in an effort to 
respond to the boundless spending appetite of travellers and visitors – from shops, 
cafés and restaurants to banks, hotels, casino, sauna, museum, entertainment 
venues and car hire companies. The third major source of revenue, after airport fees 
and concessions, was rents and leases. Prior to the 1980s and again around 2010, 
renting and leasing land, offices, and the like generated more income for Schiphol 
than retail concessions (see Graph 4). Flying, consumer operations and real estate 
were fused at the end of the twentieth century into a new concept with which 
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Schiphol established a market presence beyond the Netherlands as well: the 
AirportCity. The AirportCity, in the Schiphol Group website’s honeyed words in 
2011, was ‘a dynamic environment integrating and enhancing people and 
businesses, logistics and shopping, information and entertainment. This efficient, 
multi-modal hub for air, rail and road transport is a seamless link in the travel 
process that provides visitors a unique experience.’6 
 The growth in airside as well as landside revenues more than compensated 
for the cessation of Amsterdam subsidies after 1957. Within a very short time, 
Schiphol was not just able to support itself for the first time in its history: from 1970 
on (except for the period around 1980) it reported spectacular profits year after 
year. Graph 5 illustrates this evolution.  
 
Graph 5. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol net results from 1945 to 2011 (in millions of 
guilders). 
 
Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1945–2011 
 
The expansion of airside and landside activities also meant a massive increase in 
jobs. Schiphol became one of the fastest-growing employment centres in the 
Netherlands. Graph 6 shows how employment developed at the airport as a whole, 
at the airport operator itself (the N.V. Luchthaven Schiphol) and at the main airline 
based at Schiphol, KLM. The total number of businesses at Schiphol grew from 250 
in 1967, when the new airport had just been opened, about 370 in 1980, 420 in 1990 
and 508 in 2000 to nearly 600 in 2010 (Graph 7). Total employment at the airport 
over the last year was almost four times that of half a century earlier. In 1957, 
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14,000 people worked at Schiphol; they numbered 18,000 in 1968, 28,500 in 1980, 
42,600 in 1990, 54,500 in 2000 and more than 60,000 in 2010. 
 
Graph 6. Employment growth at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol itself and in the 
vicinity of the airport from 1945 to 2011 (left: Amsterdam Airport Schiphol as a 
whole; right: Schiphol itself). 
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Source: KLM and Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1945–2011 
 
Graph 7. Employment growth (left axis) and total number of businesses (right axis) 
at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from 1952 to 2011. 
 
Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1952–2011 
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Within the airport, the greatest employment growth was not at KLM or the airport 
operator itself, but at the other enterprises at and around the airport. While 
employment at KLM and the N.V. Luchthaven Schiphol grew by 28.6 and 64.2 per 
cent, respectively, between 1980 and 2007, employment at Schiphol as a whole grew 
by no less than 118 per cent during this period. After 1980, employment at Schiphol 
expanded much faster than in the Amsterdam region or in the Netherlands as a 
whole. The balance between the airport and the region began to shift. As a business 
location and an employment centre, Schiphol began to play a leading role in the 
development of the region as a whole.  
 Studies from the early years of the twenty-first century showed that the 
growth of Schiphol generated many extra jobs outside the airport due to both 
‘forward’ and ‘backward’ effects.7 A significant ‘forward’ effect, for example, was the 
additional employment for travel agencies and tour operators. On this side, 
Schiphol indirectly produced an estimated 14,900 to 19,700 jobs in 2001. In that 
same year, the airport indirectly produced another 27,800 to 32,500 jobs 
‘backwards’. That side consisted mainly of employment in transport and shipping 
companies, cleaning services, security firms, temporary-employment agencies and 
hotel and catering businesses. About half of all these ‘backward’ effects benefited the 
regions IJmond and Zaanstreek and the agglomerations of Haarlem and 
Amsterdam. About 78 per cent of the employment created by these ‘backward’ 
indirect effects of Schiphol was in the provinces of North and South Holland (e.g. 
the Randstad), Utrecht and Flevoland.  
 
Space 
 
The more the airport expanded and renovated, the more it made an impact on the 
space around it. To begin with, this naturally took place because the surface area of 
the airport expanded significantly. Schiphol swallowed hundreds of hectares of land, 
particularly between 1957 and 1990, as Table 1 shows. 
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Table 1. Total area of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from 1920 to 2011 (in hectares). 
1920 1938 1957 1965 1968 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 
76 210 700 1250 1480 1700 2000 2400 2678 2787 2787 
Source: Schiphol Group Annual Reports, 1920–2011 
 
The spatial effects of Schiphol’s spatial expansion, however, reached far 
beyond the airport’s fences. The airport emerged as a large-scale landowner, a 
project developer and a unique regional economic centre with exceptional 
opportunities for shaping and influencing the spatial environment in the Randstad 
and beyond. This transformation accelerated when the airport switched to a 
mainport strategy in the late 1980s. Schiphol endeavored to attract more and more 
firms and businesses by presenting itself as an appealing business location as well. 
The more businesses would set up premises at or near the airport, the more the 
airport would grow into a vital multi-modal and hub in air and ground 
transportation. In other words, Schiphol went into project development and real 
estate. And once again higher political and administrative powers provided the 
necessary backing. This was not surprising, however, because the applied spatial 
policies by the state and regional governments were focused on containing (and 
controlling) the unplanned spatial development around the airport Schiphol area. 
The involvement of the central and regional governments, through the application 
of land use policy and direct investments, would provide them not only with 
effective instruments to guide the spatial and economic policies, but also in making 
profits from investments in land and real estate activities.  
 1987 saw the advent of the Schiphol Area Development Company (SADC), 
whose objective was to acquire, develop, operate and allocate land for new 
commercial premises near and around the airport Schiphol area. One quarter of 
SADC’s stock was held by the Airport Schiphol Company (Luchthaven Schiphol 
N.V.), another quarter by the National Investment Bank, and the rest was equally 
distributed among the Province of North Holland and the Cities of Amsterdam and 
Haarlemmermeer. The Province of North Holland provided an administrative 
umbrella through a new regional plan for the Amsterdam-North Sea Canal area. A 
large area in the Haarlemmermeer around Schiphol was designated as commercial 
property to contribute to the expansion policy of the national government, the 
province and the airport.8 
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 The SADC set to work energetically. From the late 1980s onward, it 
developed extensive commercial estates in quick succession, not just on the fringes 
of the airport (such as at Schiphol-East), but also further away, on the north side of 
Hoofddorp, near Aalsmeer, Zwanenburg, Haarlem and in the western districts of 
Amsterdam, where offices and warehouses for international corporations like 
Canon, Yamaha, Mitsubishi, Hugo Boss, Unisys, UPC, BAT, KLM and Microsoft and 
all manner of small and medium-sized companies were built. Office construction 
underwent explosive growth. Two out of three office buildings currently standing in 
the Haarlemmermeer were built after 1990. 
 Project development generated real estate investment. In the late 1990s, the 
airport created the Schiphol Real Estate company (SRE), which focused on 
developing, managing and investing in commercial real estate. This activity, 
however, was not strictly linked to the Schiphol location. The SRE was also seen as 
an instrument to transplant the Airport City concept elsewhere. The lion’s share of 
the portfolio the SRE has accumulated consisted of investments in office and 
commercial space at and around Schiphol itself, but it also acquired interests in real 
estates at airports elsewhere in the Netherlands and abroad. In 2007, 4 per cent of 
the SRE’s portfolio was invested in office and commercial space at Rotterdam and 
Eindhoven airports and 6 per cent in space at Milan’s Malpensa Airport.  
 Through this kind of activities in project development and real estate 
investment, Schiphol succeeded in attracting more and more international 
companies to the Amsterdam area. The total number of international enterprises 
with offices in the Randstad increased from over 40 in 1986 to 550 in 1997 and 650 
in 2002. Of all foreign companies with offices in the Netherlands at the start of the 
twenty-first century, one out of five was located in the vicinity of Schiphol, one out 
of 10 elsewhere in the Haarlemmermeer and a little less than 10 per cent in 
Amsterdam. Schiphol became a particularly favoured location for European 
headquarters and distribution centres for businesses in the high-tech and 
electronics sectors, the pharmaceutical industry, biotechnology, chemical products, 
machines, fashion and clothing and durable consumer goods. Nearly half of all 
Japanese companies in the Netherlands were located around Schiphol at that time, 
nearly a quarter in the rest of the Haarlemmermeer and a little more than 16 per 
cent in Amsterdam. For companies from other Asian countries, the percentages 
were 24, 15 and 8 per cent, respectively, and for those from the United States 26, 13 
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and 11 per cent. Nearly 22 per cent of British companies were located in the 
Schiphol area and another 11 per cent in Amsterdam.9  
 Graph 8 shows how the supply of commercial property and office space 
developed in this area starting in the 1980s and how attractive Schiphol and its 
environs became as a business location. Although the supply of commercial estates 
in and around Schiphol increased significantly after 1990, followed a few years later 
by a huge growth in the supply of office space, the rental price of space at this 
location went up nonetheless (with the exception of that of office space after 2002) 
and remained at a higher level than at other locations in the area. The rise in rental 
price was partly due to the rise in land prices: land in these areas was after a scarce 
commodity. But there was more to it. Businesses were apparently willing to pay 
more to rent a piece of commercial property or a square metre of office space near 
the airport than to rent an equivalent space in Amsterdam, Hoofddorp, Nieuw-
Vennep or Haarlem. Schiphol and its environs, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, enjoyed the status of a ‘top location’ for businesses.  
 
Graph 8. Completion/supply (a, b) and rental prices (c, d) of offices and commercial 
estates at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and in the Amsterdam-Schiphol region from 
1982 to 2007 (open market; commercial estates >750 m2 and offices > 500 m2). 
(8a) 
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(8b) 
 
(8c) 
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(8d) 
 
Source: DTZ Zadelhoff Research 2008 
 
The impact of Schiphol on space in the greater surrounding area increased on 
another level as well. The enterprise’s shadow expanded not only across the land, 
but in the air, too. In addition to the airport’s surface and the growth of project 
development and real estate activities, changes in air traffic also made the airport an 
increasingly determining factor in the region’s development.  
 The years 1956-1958 marked a watershed in this regard as well, for then the 
national airport adopted not only a new form of management but also an ambitious 
expansion plan for an airport on a new location, designed by a commission led by 
Schiphol director Jan Dellaert. The basic idea of this ‘Dellaert Plan’ was the of 
tangential plan, the advantage of which would be that the airport would not only be 
able to operate in all kinds of weather conditions but would also be able to respond 
to future developments in air travel. When aircraft numbers increased, or when 
different types of aircraft were introduced, another runway could simply be built in 
a different direction, or with a different length. The safety risks involved in such a 
tangential pattern were considered par for the course.10 The adoption of the Dellaert 
Plan laid the framework for Schiphol’s spatial expansion for many years. Although 
the original plan was partly revised in the 1960s, the core elements of the design 
were retained by planners and Schiphol management. The decision to adopt the 
tangential plan as the basis for the future expansion of Schiphol proved to have a 
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path-dependent effect, in the sense that once the choice was made the actors 
involved continued to think and act, consciously or not, within the parameters of the 
design. 
 They also continued to do so when noise pollution became an urgent 
problem. Airplanes make a lot of noise – many of the people involved, experts or 
not, were aware of this in the 1950s too. Yet in the spatial planning of the time by 
the municipalities around Schiphol, the potential rise of noise nuisance and air 
pollution of Schiphol was either more or less ignored or dismissed as an 
unimportant issue. Amsterdam, the municipalities of Amstelveen and the 
Haarlemmermeer had planned new residential areas without taking Schiphol’s 
growth and the airport spatial expansion plans into account. As results, conflicts 
between airport and its surrounding municipalities began to rise. Long discussions 
between airport authorities and local and regional government parties took place to 
take concrete measure to limit the growth of Schiphol and to take into account the 
possibility to delocalise the airport activities elsewhere. When the regional and local 
authorities did not succeed to agree about the issue of the spatial expansion and 
growth of Schiphol airport, the Dutch government decided –as compromise- then to 
apply new rules that regulate the levels of noise nuisance around the airport and its 
surrounding areas.   
In addition, the Dutch government integrated the airport’s spatial planning into 
national spatial planning – the idea being that this would make it possible to keep 
the negative effects of growth under control and simultaneously provide Schiphol 
the opportunity to expand within certain limits. On the one hand, aircrafts would 
have to be made ‘quieter’ and on the other hand construction would have to be 
planned so that as few people as possible would be inconvenienced by air traffic. In 
order to define the margins of liveability around Schiphol, ‘noise contours’ were 
introduced as an instrument: lines on the map indicating the (calculated) aircraft 
‘noise exposure’ for a given area (see Map 1).11 
 Noise contours and regulations on ‘acceptable’ noise and liveability were 
revised more than once in keeping with the evolution of aviation technology. In 
1990, for example, Schiphol and the Netherlands Aviation Authority set up a new 
system for measuring aircraft noise around the airport (NOMOS). The state then 
issued a new guideline indicating the zones in which no large-scale construction 
would be allowed to take place, due to excessive noise nuisance. In 2004, within the 
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framework of a new Aviation Act, decisions were again enacted setting maximum 
limits for noise and air pollution in and above Schiphol, codified the use of land 
around the airport and defined in which areas construction was prohibited due to 
noise nuisance and/or other environmental considerations.12 
Map 1. Noise contours (35 decibels, 45 dB, 55 dB and 65 dB) around Schiphol, 1975. 
 
Source: El Makhloufi 2009 (computation based on Schiphol Group Annual Reports) 
 
Map 2. Noise contours and restrictions on construction around Schiphol, 2004. 
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Source: El Makhloufi 2009 (computation based on ‘Schiphol en u: de regels’ 
(‘Schiphol and You: The Rules’)), Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management). 
 
So at the end of the twentieth century, Schiphol was creating more and more 
employment; at the same time, it was creating obstacles to housing construction in 
many locations. Available space for housing in the region decreased as a result of 
increased regulation related to the airport’s nuisance levels (Map 2). The ‘sky’ 
provided a direction for developments on the ‘ground’. And on the ground, starting 
in the 1980s, the airport was steadily transforming into an independent, dynamic 
factor in spatial planning. Because of its function as a hub in national and 
international transport networks, Schiphol became an economic centre, an ‘airport 
city’ in itself, which generated its own agglomeration effects and competed with 
established urban centres on a regional level. Schiphol increasingly resembled   a 
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typical downtown centre: uninhabited, but bustling with activities. Economically 
and morphologically, the weight of the airport in relation to urban centres in the 
area, Amsterdam included, was constantly increasing. 
This change in the relationship of the Schiphol airport city with other urban centres 
in the area corresponded with a shift in the regional spatial pattern from a 
monocentric, hierarchical urban system to a more polynuclear urban system – in 
other words, a system of urban networks. Over time, Schiphol acquired an 
increasingly central position, in economic and spatial terms, in the new, emerging 
urban system, in which qualities such as proximity, accessibility and connectivity 
became the leading forces stimulating economic growth and employment. The 
importance of Schiphol for the Dutch economy as a whole and that of the region 
around Amsterdam in particular increased substantially. And the more attractive 
Schiphol became, thanks to its hub function and as location for national and 
international companies, the more demand for office space and commercial estates 
also increased, as well as housing space for the tens of thousands of people who 
found work at or around the airport.13 No single actor – not the national nor the 
regional government – was able to influence (directly or indirectly) the dynamics of 
the spatial development of the airport Schiphol. This is because the introduction of 
the new organization form of the international airport of the Netherlands, provided 
Schiphol with the needed instruments to become a powerful actor in the region and 
at the national level. Consequently, spatial urban sprawl was not taking place only 
from the agglomeration of Amsterdam towards it surrounding areas, but also from 
the airport Schiphol regions towards these surrounding areas of the agglomeration 
of Amsterdam. The sub-urban areas between the agglomeration of Amsterdam and 
the Schiphol region were filled by an increasing number of industrial parks, office 
locations and residential areas. So, the airport Schiphol has played an important 
role in the emergence of the so-called ‘nebula city’ during the 20th century 
development of the metropolitan region Amsterdam.  
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